Abstract: This paper investigates how outside ranking organizations such as U.S. News and World Report affect colleges' admission decisions. To do so, we focus on a policy that has received criticism for being motivated by ranking concerns: optional reporting of SAT I scores. This policy allows colleges to report an average SAT I score based on those applicants who chose to submit their scores which may not be reflective of actual student body quality. We use proprietary data from two liberal arts colleges to address how the optional reporting policy affects the colleges' admission decisions as well as how applicants' SAT I scores influences their decision to submit these scores to the colleges. The data suggest that college admission departments are behaving strategically by rewarding applicants who do submit their SAT I scores when their scores will raise the college's average SAT I score reported to U.S. News and World Report and rewarding applicants who do not submit when their SAT I scores will lower the college's reported score. The data also suggest that applicants are behaving strategically by choosing not to reveal their SAT I scores if they are below a value one might predict based on their other observable characteristics.
I. Introduction
As the above quotes suggest, the adoption of optional SAT policies is extremely controversial and the trend is toward more colleges 1 making the reporting of standardized test scores, such as the SAT I (the two-part standardized verbal and math test) 2 , voluntary. The adopting schools often argue that the test score differentials in the SAT are not a result of aptitude differences but rather biases in the test that favor particular groups. For example, when University of California President Richard C. Atkinson announced his recommendation that the university no longer include the SAT I test as a requirement he stated, "[T]hat a perception among ethnic minority groups that the SAT I is unfair cannot be easily making the SAT and ACT optional, we hope to broaden the applicant pool and increase access at Wake Forest for groups of students who are currently underrepresented at selective universities" (Lewin, 2008) .
Critics of these policies suggest that the policies are an attempt to increase the school's ranking. For those schools that implement an optional SAT policy, the mean SAT score the school reports to the ranking organizations is computed based not on the entire student body but only on the scores from those students who chose to submit. If students with higher SAT scores are more likely to submit, an optional SAT policy will increase the average SAT score the school reports to the ranking organizations.
3 Brownstein (2001) 
in
The Chronicle of Higher Education describes it this way:
The thesis, first stated last year by The New Republic, is that colleges are being less than honest about why they abolish requirements that applicants submit their SAT scores. Behind the rhetoric about "enhancing diversity" and creating a more "holistic approach" to admissions, the theory goes, many colleges "go optional" on the SAT to improve their rankings. The logic is rather simple: At an SAT-optional college, students with higher scores are far more likely to submit them, raising the institution's mean SAT score and hence the heavily test-influenced rankings. Levin (2002) suggests that " [I] n an effort to boost their selectivity rankings some schools have dropped the SAT requirement for admission; other schools may be tempted to admit more students with high SATs [page 8]." Perhaps this criticism explains the following excerpt from a May 27, 2008 press release issued by Wake Forest University (2008) announcing their adoption of an optional policy:
Like other universities, Wake Forest is asked to provide standardized test score data to outside agencies. For this data to be accurate, Wake Forest will ask students who chose not to submit scores during the admissions process to provide them after they are accepted and before they enroll at Wake Forest.
Skeptics will note that disclosure of SAT I scores is still voluntary and, therefore, may be incomplete. A more accurate measure of enrolled student's SAT I scores can come from requesting those scores for free from the College Board. 3 An optional SAT policy may also affect the pool of applicants which is likely to influence schools' rankings by changing their acceptance and yield rates.
There are many such ranking organization, but the rankings provided by U.S. News and World Report, a publication that has circulation of more than 2 million every year (Selingo, 2007 , http://chronicle.com/free/v53/i38/38a01501.htm), receives considerable attention.
Mechanically, SAT I scores make up 40 percent of the student selectivity ranking category of the U.S. News and World Report rankings, thereby providing incentives to maximize the revealed quality of students. 4 A survey of 241 schools conducted by the Association of Governing Boards found that 51 percent of schools reported attempting to increase their rankings in the U.S. News and World Report (Levin, 2002) and there are many anecdotal reports of efforts to boost rankings (see Ehrenberg, 2002 and Farrell and Van Der Werf, 2007) . About one quarter of the top 100 liberal arts colleges ranked by U.S. News & World Report have optional SAT I policies. In addition to being widely read and considered influential among higher income students (Levin, 2002) , there is evidence that spending per pupil and objective measures of college quality are positively correlated with improvements in rankings (Jin and Whalley, 2007 and Ehrenberg, 1999) .
This optional SAT policy gives us an ideal setting for testing not only whether schools'
incentives to increase their rankings in publications such as U.S. News and World Report influence admissions decisions, but also the theoretical implications of the voluntary disclosure literature. This paper is the first to empirically test whether colleges' incentives to increase their ranking influenced their admissions processes. Using the admissions data from two colleges with an optional SAT I policy, we find evidence that these colleges behave strategically in their admission decisions in an effort to improve their school's ranking. The data suggest that, ceteris paribus, the college is more likely to accept applicants who do not submit their SAT I scores if submitting their scores would decrease the average SAT I score 4 During the time period of our data, US News and World Report used the following criteria and weights for ranking colleges: Student Selectivity 15%, Academic reputation (survey of other colleges) 25%, Faculty resources 20%, Graduation and retention rate 20%, Financial resources (expenditure per student) 10%, Alumni giving (rate) 5%, and Graduation rate 5%. Under the Student Selectivity criterion, the weights associated with the different selectivity rankings are SAT/Act scores 40%, Acceptance Rate 15%, Yield 10% and High school class standing in top ten percent 35%.
the colleges report to the ranking organizations. Likewise, the college is more likely to accept applicants who do submit their SAT I scores if submitting their scores would increase their reported average SAT I score. As for the applicants' decisions, we find a large share who choose not to submit their SAT I scores. In addition, we show that applicants behave strategically by choosing not to submit their SAT I scores if their actual scores are below a value one might predict based on their other observable characteristics.
Section II describes the data and specific optional SAT policies from two liberal arts colleges while Section III summarizes the relevant literature. Section IV presents evidence that colleges are acting strategically to increase a student quality measure (average SAT I scores) reported to the ranking organizations and applicants are acting strategically when deciding whether to submit their SAT I score. Section V concludes.
II. Data and Institutional Details
Our primary data come from two schools in the northeast, each with approximately 1800 students enrolled. 5 Both report a typical SAT I score in the upper 1200s (out of 1600 and relative to a mean score for all persons taking the SAT I of approximately 1020 (College Board, 2002) ). For College X, we have two recent years of data, about five years into the school's optional SAT policy. For College Y, we have one recent year of data, the first year that the school instituted the optional SAT policy.
For each applicant, our primary source is the details from the applications that were entered into the admissions' databases. Of course, we know whether or not applicants chose to submit their SAT I scores. The admissions' databases contain SAT I scores for those who submit them as well as SAT II 6 and ACT scores, more curriculum based exams, for those who submit. More generally, the data contain characteristics of the applicants that include race, gender, legacy status, and high school grade point average (GPA). The data include characteristics of the high school such as type (private or public), high school name, and state. In addition, the data identify whether the applicant applied early decision and intended to apply for financial aid. The dataset also contains the admissions decision made on the applicant, accept or not, and enrollment decision. These data are similar across the colleges.
The data also contain numerous college performance measures for those who enroll in College X and a few of these measures for College Y.
One crucial variable that is often missing from the college admissions data is the SATI scores for the applicants who chose not to submit their SAT I scores. Although the college obtains these data for a minority of applicants, particularly those who ultimately enroll, we purchased a data match of SAT scores from the College Board to identify SAT I scores for the remainder. We drop the international applicants from our analysis primarily because the probability of obtaining a match with the College Board data is very low due to the lack of social security numbers. 7 Finally, we exclude applicants who withdrew from consideration before admission decisions were made, which is about 13 percent from College X and 5 percent from College Y. 8 The College Board data also include SAT II scores, AP test scores, and responses to the student descriptive questionnaire (SDQ) that is filled out at the time the applicants take their SATs. The SDQ includes self-reported data on family income as well as high school activities, awards, grades 9 , and class rank.
While both Colleges X and Y allow applicants to choose whether to submit their SATI scores, they differ in terms of other required test scores. Whether or not they submit their SAT I scores, College X requires applicants to submit either their ACT scores or three 7 We also drop fewer than two percent of domestic students for whom we cannot identify an SAT I score. 8 The reduced form results are similar with and without these observations. 9 As an alternative measure of academic preparedness, high school GPA has the potential to be crucial in analyzing student and college behavior. Unfortunately, GPA scales as reported on applications are not even remotely standardized across high schools and therefore comparisons are extremely difficult (see Chaker, 2003) . College Y did not even record high school GPA for many of their applicants in their admissions data. We contacted as many high schools as possible and asked them for their GPA scales but the resulting data were extremely complicated, giving us little confidence in their usefulness. Overall, applicants at both schools are from the high end of the income distribution.
Conditional on reporting a family income, and many do not, income greater than $100,000 is the most common response. While small fractions of applicants at both schools are legacies and apply early decision, slightly more than half indicate that they intend to apply for financial aid. More than 83 percent of all applicants are white and more than three-quarters are from the northeast United States, which includes the states where the colleges reside.
III. Literature Review
Because schools are imposing a voluntary disclosure policy, we consider both the theoretical and empirical literature on voluntary disclosure. Our hypothesis is that these policy choices are motivated by incentives to improve college rankings; therefore, we also discuss the literature on college rankings.
IV. Theoretical Literature
The theory of voluntary disclosure suggests that, if disclosure is costless, mandatory disclosure is not necessary to solve the problem of asymmetric information between two parties. This theory implies that even with voluntary disclosure, all individuals (or firms) will have an incentive to reveal their private information to avoid the other party assuming that their decision to withhold information implies something worse than their actual private information. Grossman and Hart (1980) formalize this "unraveling" equilibrium. 13 Grossman (1981) generalizes the results in Grossman and Hart (1980) and considers voluntary disclosure of a product's quality. Milgrom (1981) also generalizes the results by considering voluntary disclosure along multiple dimensions instead of a single dimension. Similar to Grossman and Hart, Milgrom proves that, in every sequential equilibrium, the informed party fully discloses all private information when disclosure is costless. With costly disclosure, 13 They present this "unraveling" equilibrium in the context of the Security and Exchange Commission requiring parties to a takeover bid to disclose particular information instead of allowing voluntary disclosure while outlawing false statements. Jovanovic (1982) identifies an equilibrium where unraveling occurs but the unraveling is not complete. Specifically, the equilibrium is such that an individual will voluntary disclose if this private information is above some "quality" threshold and will not reveal if it is below this threshold. 14, 15 These theoretical papers model environments as standard Bayesian games and make strong assumptions about the informational structure. Specifically, they all assume common knowledge and that the beliefs of the uninformed party are based on Bayesian updating. Eyster and Rabin (2005) present an equilibrium concept where each player correctly predicts the distribution of the other players' actions, but underestimates the degree to which these actions are correlated with their private information. They term this equilibrium concept a "cursed equilibrium" and provide anecdotal evidence that this concept explains many empirically observed phenomena, including the winner's curse. Eyster and Rabin apply this concept to voluntary disclosure games to explain why everyone might not disclose their information even when disclosure is costless.
Under the assumptions of common knowledge, Bayesian updating, and low costs of submitting SAT I scores, the basic voluntary disclosure theory predicts that only those with the lowest SAT I scores should withhold them. In the context of college admissions the common knowledge and Bayesian updating assumptions may be inappropriate for a number of reasons. First, common knowledge may not exist because applicants generally have limited experience applying to colleges. In addition, particularly in early years of the policy, as we have in our data for College Y, the college may have imperfect information about an applicants' decisions not to submit and how the policy affects their applicant pool.
Furthermore, colleges may be motivated in their enactment of the optional SAT I policy by measures of reported quality to ranking institutions, which may not be fully understood by 14 Jovanovic applies the model to an environment where a business chooses whether or not to disclose its product's quality and proves that it may not be socially-optimal to mandate disclosure. 15 Shavell (1994) contributes to the voluntary disclosure literature by endogenizing a party's decision to acquire the private information.
applicants. Finally, colleges may not fully understand the mapping between an applicant's SAT I scores and his/her decision to submit, perhaps resulting in a "cursed equilibrium".
V. Empirical Literature
There are several empirical papers testing voluntary disclosure. The ideal information to test this theory includes whether the private information is revealed and, if it is not, what that private information is. In practice, these data are rarely available and, therefore, most researchers attempt to infer this information from related outcome measures.
Mathios (2000) shows that before mandatory disclosure laws, salad dressings with the highest fat content, as measured ex-post to mandatory disclosure, were more likely not to report their ingredients. Using pre-and post-sales data, he also provides evidence that consumers incorrectly inferred the fat content for those salad dressings that did not disclose.
Jin and Leslie (2003) test the implications of the voluntary disclosure models using information on city council votes to adopt a Los Angeles County ordinance requiring restaurants to publicly display hygiene grade cards. While unable to observe which restaurants voluntarily disclosed their hygiene rating, the paper provides evidence consistent with the notion that unraveling occurred in the jurisdictions that did not adopt the ordinance. 16 Jin (2005) considers individual HMOs' decisions to reveal accreditation and specific performance measures. She finds evidence that the level of competition in the market affects disclosure decisions, namely that HMOs in highly competitive markets have stronger incentives to differentiate via disclosure.
Although they do not focus on the unraveling hypothesis, Robinson and Monks (2005) look at the voluntary disclosure of SAT I scores in the first year of the policy at Mount Holyoke College. Using a select sample of non-submitters for whom they have SAT I scores (48 percent of non-submitters, most of whom enrolled), they show that non-submitters have average SAT I scores that are lower (by 141 points) than submitters and that those who do not submit perform relatively poorly on the test relative to their other qualities. They also conclude that students who do not submit their scores have an advantage in the admissions process. Unlike Robinson and Monks, we have the private information for almost all applicants in our data and we use this information to consider whether ranking organizations influence the school's admission decisions. To properly address this question, we also document which types of applicants choose not to disclose and find results qualitatively similar to those of Robinson and Monks.
We turn now to the sparse empirical evidence on the effect U.
S. News and World
Report and other ranking organizations on school policies and outcomes. Jin and Whalley (2007) are the only researchers, to our knowledge, that look for behavioral responses to rankings. They find that colleges newly exposed to the U.S. News and World Report rankings experienced increased expenditure per student, a factor that receives approximately 20 percent weight in the ranking formula. They show that this increase is driven by increases in state appropriations. In other words, states directly increase the expenditures per students in their budgets. They hypothesize that states' responses reflect increased attention to college quality due to inclusion in the U.S. News and World Report rankings.
There is a relatively small literature on the reverse question: how do rankings affect college outcomes? An early paper by Monks and Ehrenberg (1999) uses a set of national universities and liberal arts colleges that are highly ranked by U.S. News and World Report between 1989 and 1999. They show that improvements in rankings are correlated with higher selectivity, as measured by the admissions rates (students admitted/applicants), and lower uncertainty in the admission process through higher yield rates (matriculants/admitted students). Improved rankings are also associated with attracting different students, in particular, those with higher SAT scores and less financial aid need. Using individual data for a sample of students admitted to Colgate University between 1994 and 2004, Griffith and Rask (2007) find that schools with higher U.S. News and World Report rankings have an advantage in attracting students and the advantage is greater among students who are not receiving financial aid. Both of these papers suggest that improved rankings are positively correlated with improvements in measurable college outcomes.
VI. Colleges' and Applicants' Strategic Behavior

A. Colleges' Admission Decisions
Ehrenberg (2005) and others argue that the intense competition for students among colleges is magnified by the U.S. News and World Report's ranking of schools and this ranking encourages colleges to implement policies designed to manipulate the rankings. The survey conducted by the Association of Governing Boards found that many schools admit taking actions specifically designed to increase their rankings in the U.
S. News and World
Report (Levin, 2002) . The potential benefit in terms of the rankings associated with implementing an optional SAT I policy is evident from Table 2 . For both colleges, the table shows that for applicants who do not submit, not only is the average SAT I score lower but the average is also lower conditional on being accepted and conditional on enrolling. With the potentially strong assumption that the optional SAT I policy does not affect the applicant pool, the college's acceptance decisions or the applicants' enrollment decisions, this policy would increase the average SAT I score reported to U.S. News and World Report from 1,254 to 1,281 for College X and from 1,280 to 1,301 for College Y. While our data set does not allow us to test whether the applicant pool or the enrollment decisions change as the result of the optional SAT I policy, it does allow us to test whether ranking concerns influence the colleges' acceptance decisions.
To do so, we regress the college's acceptance decision on a set of observables that include the student's decision to submit his/her SAT I score. In addition, we control for his/her actual SAT I score in hundreds (whether the applicant submitted the score or not), a dummy for whether the applicant submitted his/her SAT I score, a dummy for whether the applicant submitted his/her SAT II (ACT) score, the actual SAT II (ACT) score if the candidate submitted it, a dummy for whether the applicant applied early decision, and a set of ability and demographic measures from the candidate's application. The first and third columns of Table 3 present the coefficient estimates of a probit regression. The actual SAT I score is positively and statistically significantly related to the probability of acceptance. The coefficients on whether the applicant submitted his/her score are negative and statistically significant for both Colleges X and Y. These coefficient estimates suggest that submitting SAT I scores decreases the probability of acceptance by 0.16 for Colleges X and Y. In other words, colleges reward students who take advantage of the optional SAT I policy, all else equal.
Our hypothesis is that this reward may vary, depending on how the student's SAT I score might affect the average reported score. For example, there may be higher probability of admissions conditional on not submitting scores if an applicant has a lower SAT I score, relative to an applicant with a higher SAT I score, because that applicant's score will decrease the average reported SAT I score if he/she enrolls. Likewise, schools have incentive to differentially reward an applicant with a higher score if he/she submits the score, because the applicant's score will increase the reported SAT I score if he/she enrolls. To account for this, we add an interaction term between whether an applicant submits his/her SAT I score and his/her actual SAT I Score/100. The second and fourth columns of Table 3 present the coefficient estimates of this specification. For both colleges, the coefficient estimate associated with submitting an SAT I score remains negative while the estimate associated with the interaction term is positive and statistically significant. These coefficient estimates indicate that the negative effect of reporting your SAT I score on the probability of being accepted decreases with the SAT I score. This is consistent with the premise that the admission departments behave strategically to favor applicants with low SAT I scores who do not submit (relative to those that do submit) and this favoritism decreases as the scores increase.
Recalling that the school does not view the actual SAT I score for those who do not submit, we now suppose that the colleges naively infer that the SAT I scores of those who do not submit are the "predicted" scores based on the applicants' other observables. 17 We estimate this "predicted" score by regressing the SAT I scores for applicants who submitted their scores on the set of applicant characteristics observable to the college (the regression results are in Table A1 ). We then use the coefficient estimates from this regression and the applicants' observables to "predict" SAT I scores for those who did not submit their SAT I
scores. The predicted test scores, where the averages are shown in Table 2 , for those who did NOT submit are substantially above their actual SAT I scores. For College X, the average predicted SAT I scores is 1219 versus an actual average of 1139, while for College Y the average predicted SAT I score is 36 points higher than the actual average (1264 versus 1228) and these means are statistically different than one another at standard levels.
In Table 4 , we show the coefficient estimates and bootstrapped standard errors for a specification identical to that in Table 3 except we use the predicted SAT I scores, rather than the actual scores, for those applicants that do not submit. By comparing the SAT I related coefficient estimates in Table 3 with those in Table 4 , it is evident that the main conclusions drawn from these estimates change little if we assume the colleges naively infer instead of perfectly infer the non-submitters' SAT I scores.
The magnitudes of the point estimates in Table 4 (associated with whether the applicants submit their SAT I score and the SAT I interaction term) are particularly supportive of our hypothesis that rankings motivate the colleges' behaviors. They suggest that, ceteris paribus, applicants who submit their SAT I score are less likely to be accepted by An alternative explanation for the positive correlation between not submitting one's SAT I scores and acceptance is an omitted variable bias. Specifically, perhaps there are characteristics of the applicant observable to the admissions offices, but not to us, which make the applicant a good "match" for the college. These characteristics might include interview or essay quality or expected participation on the college's varsity athletic teams.
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This alternative explanation may seem reasonable in explaining the positive correlation between not submitting and acceptance, but is less plausible when the interaction term is included as a covariate. For the "match" quality argument to explain these results, applicants with lower scores who do not submit must have higher match quality, which manifests itself in higher probabilities of acceptance. Likewise, those with higher scores who chose not to submit must have lower match quality, manifested in lower acceptance probabilities.
While we do not find it particularly plausible that the match quality is correlated with scores and submission decisions in this way, we further consider the possibility that the admission decision reflects information about the quality of the applicant-college match. To do this, we consider whether subsequent measures of college performance are correlated with scores and submission decisions in a similar manner as the admission decisions. If so, this would suggest that the results in Tables 3 and 4 are attributable to our inability to control for characteristics of the applicant that are observed by the admission departments and correlated with the decision to submit.
We have numerous college performance measures to proxy for the match quality.
Some are academic, such as GPAs and academic honors. Other measures that are not necessarily academic, such a retention and involvement in the social life of the college through student government, sports and study abroad, may better reflect how the unobservable characteristics manifest themselves in positive college outcomes.
In Tables 5A and 5B , each column represents a regression where the dependent variable is a different college outcome measure. The covariates are the same as in Tables 3,   but we report only the coefficients of interest. Table 5A shows the results when the decision to submit and the SAT I score are entered separately, but not interacted, and Table 5B 18 The admission departments at both colleges construct numerical academic and personal scores for each applicant. The personal scores reflect the college's interactions with the applicant. Including the scores as a covariate in Tables 3 and 4 changes the results very little.
presents the results when we include the interaction term. 19 Without the interaction term in Table 5A , submitting his/her SAT I scores is often negatively correlated with the college outcome, but among the negative coefficients we can only reject that the coefficient is significantly different than zero when the dependent variable is number of sports at College X or freshman year GPA at College Y. More importantly, when we include the interaction term as a covariate in Table 5B , only three of the 15 performance measures have a negative coefficient estimate associated with submitting an SAT I score and a positive estimate associated with the interaction term. In all three cases, the coefficient estimates are not statistically significant. There is no evidence from these measures of subsequent college performance, that match quality is correlated with the decision to submit one's SAT I scores or that applicants with lower SAT I scores who submit have higher match quality. In summary, our empirical findings that suggest ranking concerns influence admissions decisions do not seem to be due to applicants' characteristics unobservable to us but observable to the colleges.
Tables 5A and 5B find predictive power in the SAT I score, primarily with respect to academic achievements such as GPAs and academic honors such a Phi Beta Kappa. Work by Rothstein (2004) suggests that there is predictive value in knowing a student's SAT I score, even controlling for the selection through matriculation. SAT I score is also positively correlated with freshman retention, but only for College Y. Note that the SAT I score is not correlated with any of our retention measures for College X. This is likely due to a combination of poor performing students being asked to leave the college and strong performing students transferring to better colleges.
B. Applicants' Voluntary Disclosure Decisions
The previous subsection suggests that schools behave strategically in their admissions decisions. Given that we have the private information, SAT I scores, of the applicants who 19 The results are similar when we replace actual SAT I scores with predicted SAT I scores for those applicants who choose not to submit these scores. These results are available from the authors.
choose not to submit them, we further investigate the strategic behavior of applicants. The results in Table 2 that average predicted SAT I scores (see Table A1 ) are greater than average actual SAT I scores for those who do not submit their scores provides evidence that at least a set of applicants behave strategically. The scatterplots in Figure 2 show the entire distribution of the difference in the predicted SAT I score and the actual SAT I score for those who do not submit their SAT I scores. These scatterplots indicate a positive relationship between actual and predicted SAT I scores with the predicted score being greater than actual score for the majority of applicants who choose not to submit. Eighty-three percent of the College X applicants and 66 percent of College Y applicants that do not submit the SAT I score have a predicted score greater than their actual score. Table 6 provides additional evidence that some applicants behave strategically when deciding whether to submit their SAT I scores based on a probit regression of whether an applicant chooses to not submit his/her SAT I scores on the same set of ability and demographic measures as in Table 3 . 20 The coefficient estimates suggest that, ceteris paribus, applicants with higher SAT I scores are less likely to choose not to submit their score. Specifically, an increase of 100 points in an applicant's SAT I score decreases the probability of not submitting by 0.11 for College X and 0.09 for College Y. However, applicants with higher alternative measures of academic ability, like SAT II scores and high school GPAs are more likely to choose not to submit their score, all else equal. Some of the correlates suggest that students who are better informed may be more likely to not submit their SAT I scores. For example, students from private high schools are more likely to not submit their SAT I scores and African Americans applicants to College X are less likely to not submit their SAT scores. Conditional on the applicant pool, these correlations are not consistent with the stated goals of the schools adopting these policies in an effort to increase diversity. Women applicants are more likely to not submit their SAT scores, conditional on 20 Note that the dependent variable equals one when the applicant does not submit.
those scores. One possible explanation for the gender difference is that the psychological costs of reporting one's score varies with gender. Specifically there are numerous claims that the standardized SAT exams are biased against certain demographic groups including women, which might impose higher psychological costs of submitting their SAT scores.
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While these results suggest that some applicants are behaving strategically when choosing whether to submit their SAT I scores, they do not provide much insight into why so many applicants do not submit. The theoretical models of voluntary disclosure predict that almost all applicants will submit if the cost of disclosure is nominal -as we expect it is for the majority of applicants. One explanation for why 16 percent of applicants to College X and 24 percent to College Y do not submit is that some applicants are poorly informed in terms of how the colleges make admission decisions. Specifically, our earlier results suggest that the colleges act strategically to improve their reported quality so that the combination of actual SAT I scores and whether the applicant submits them is what the colleges care about.
Another possible explanation is that applicants believe the colleges will incorrectly infer their actual SAT I scores if they do not submit them, consistent with the cursed equilibrium.
VII. Conclusions
Colleges increase the uncertainty associated with their applicants' quality through voluntary SAT I policies. The applicant characteristics correlated with not submitting their SAT I scores are not consistent with the colleges' stated goal of increasing economic and social diversity. Specifically, applicants from private high schools who are non-minorities are more likely to take advantage of the policy, all else equal. More generally, college admission data matched with confidential data from the College Board allows us to show that 21 FairTest, the National Center for Fair & Open Testing, cites admissions staff members who indicate that some college applicants do not report their test scores for "philosophical reasons" (page 19) or as a "show of support" (page 23) for the school's policy (Rooney and Schaeffer 1998) . For evidence that women and men compete differently, see Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) . 22 For research that considers whether the SAT exams are biased, see Bridgeman and Lewis (1996) , Steele (1999) , and Wainer and Steinberg (1992) .
applicants who under-perform on the standardized test relative to their other observables are most likely to take advantage of the policy.
Critics suggest this policy that introduces uncertainty about the standardized tests scores of applicants is an attempt to improve their college's ranking in places like U.S. News and World Report. Indeed, we find evidence that colleges are rewarding applicants in the admission process who submit their SAT I scores when their SAT I scores will raise the college's average and rewarding applicants who do not submit when their SAT I scores will lower the college's average.
The decisions to make SAT I scores optional appear particularly paradoxical in light of increased reliance on standardized testing. This reliance contributes to the estimated $500 million per year test preparation industry (Eduventures, 2004) The empirical results in this paper and others suggests that SAT I scores do provide additional information on how the applicant will perform in college. By choosing to implement an optional SAT policy, these colleges must perceive the benefit of this policy on the college's ranking and other goals to be greater than the cost associated with forgoing the additional information on the applicants contained in their SAT I scores. SS, statistical significance ; *** statistically different at 1% level, ** statistically different at 5% level, * # Statistically different than the actual SATI score at the 1% level. *Regression Results are in Table A1 of the Appendix. Notes: Includes same set of covariates as in Table 3 . Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% Notes: All specifications include same set of covariates as in Table 3 . For College Y number of sports is over college career and for College Y number of sports is freshman year. The probit coefficients are not marginal effects. Standard errors in parentheses: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. Notes: All specifications include same set of covariates as in Table 3 . For College Y number of sports is over college career and for College Y number of sports is freshman year. The probit coefficients are not marginal effects. Standard errors in parentheses: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
